Throughout the past two decades, the apparel export industry has grown rapidly, doubling its export value since the turn of the millenium. So has the number of supplier firms producing in the apparel global value chain (GVC). But have these apparel manufacturers been able to benefit from participating in the GVC?
The academic literature is divided on this matter: Some authors have argued that the gains of globalized apparel production have been solely appropriated by ‘fabless’ brands and retailers from developed economies that have outsourced all production to supplier firms. According to their account, what matters for value capture are intangible assets (such as brand rights, patents, trademarks), as these kind of assets shield buyers from competition in end markets. As global buyers control most intangible assets in the apparel GVC, and therefore access to end markets, they capture the bulk of profits that accrue in the industry. In contrast, owning machines and plants yields none or only a marginal profit. Manufacturers compete with a global pool of similar firms which lowers their bargaining power vis-à-vis global brands and retailers. Therefore, since the early 21st century, these firms became increasingly ‘squeezed’ by the pricing and sourcing requirements from global buyers.
Authors taking a contrasting position in turn argue that apparel manufacturing remains a lucrative business, emphasizing that specialized contract manufacturing and strategic buyer relationships allow to capture significant value. Based on their narrative, some apparel manufacturers grew significantly in size and have reaped economies of scale, while benefitting from stagnating labor costs. Notably, they argue that fashion brands and retailers have become increasingly dependent on large contract manufacturers to sustain their market growth. As apparel manufacturers obtained strategic capabilities in fulfilling production specifications, logistics and forecasting, they left a subservient position vis-à-vis brands and retailers, and instead became ‘strategic partners’, which ultimately allowed apparel manufacturers to capture more value.
The cases of Shenzhou International and Eclat Textile
The best way to find out which of the contrasting positions is right is to study those apparel manufacturers that have been able to capture the most value in recent years. According to the Capital IQ database, the two most profitable apparel manufacturers of the past decade were Shenzhou International based in China, and Eclat Textile from Taiwan. As Figure 1 displays, the revenue of both firms grew rapidly during the 2010s, tripling their revenue during that period. At the same time, they were also able to sell their goods to buyers at an annual gross profit margin of more than 25%, which is the highest among all publicly traded apparel supplier firms. Which factors have led to this combination of expanding revenues in tandem with exceptionally high profit rates?
Figure 1: Shenzhou’s and Eclat’s annual revenue (in 1000 USD) and gross profit margin (%), 2005-2022
Source: Capital IQ database, 2023
Shenzhou’s vertical integration of high-tech sportswear
Shenzhou International was formed in 1988, combining the investment of the Ningbo District government and an existing textile firm called Shanghai Knitting. Its current principal owner, Ma Jianrong gained a control share towards the end of the 1990s and sought to cater global buyers. In 1997, Shenzhou began to produce casual wear for the Japanese retailer Uniqlo. The shift in business strategy that put Shenzhou on its current growth trajectory occurred in the mid-2000s with its new focus on vertically integrated sportswear covering all production steps including synthetic fabric co-development with buyers, textile production, dyeing, assembly, printing, and embroidery. Shenzhou made an Initial Public Offering on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 2005 and used to the proceeds to invest in dyeing and textile machines. Shenzhou also began to cater the largest global sportswear brands and established specially-designed factory complexes for Nike (2006) and Adidas (2008).
At the core of this strategy was to work with buyers to develop a set of high-value tech fabrics that could be used in sports- and footwear and then rapidly scale up vertically integrated production once demand increases. This included Nike’s lightweight, breathable and temperature-regulating Tech Fleece for sports jackets introduced in 2007; and Uniqlo’s Airism fabric launched in 2013, which combines sweat absorbing and breathable functions for shirts and underwear. The largest revenue stream, however, was generated with the launch of the Flyknit material, which is used for the upper part of Nike’s running and football shoes. To sustain these relationships, Shenzhou invested in knitted and woven fabric capacities, which grew at a double-digit rate throughout the 2010s. By the end of that decade, Shenzhou had become the largest supplier for Nike, Adidas, and Uniqlo, accounting for 10%, 10% and 8% respectively they buyer overall sourcing value.
Capturing value from these activities was not achieved by owning the patents for these specific technologies but rather by co-developing the fabric and increasing production at scale. A study on Shenzhou’s patent portfolio from 2017 notes that the company owns 90 patents of new materials and fabrics, and 156 patents for transformation and innovation of equipment and technique for production. But these intangible assets only accounted for 0.3% of all Shenzhou’s assets. The bulk of Shenzhou’s assets are plants and machinery, that accounted for USD 1.86 billion or 48% of total assets in 2022. In turn, the patents and trademarks of three technologies that were at the core of Shenzhou’s growth – Nike Flynkit and Tech Fleece, and Uniqlo Airism are all held by the brands. What accounted for Shenzhou’s value capture from these technologies was therefore vertical integration and expansion in manufacturing, linked to the end market strategy of the buyer.
Eclat Textile’s vertical integration in athleisure
Eclat Textile started in apparel assembly in 1977, but soon after established capabilities in stretchable knit fabrics (1983) and Nylon (1993). Throughout the 1990s, other Taiwanese-based apparel manufacturers such as Nien Hsing Textile or Tainan Enterprises were dominating the export industry, supplying Levi’s or Gap Inc., some of the largest buyers at the time, with denim and casual wear products.
Yet, this changed with the boom in active, functional and athleisure wear throughout the 2010s: Eclat’s business focus on co-development and fabrication of elastic knitted fabrics, and assembly of sportswear made it a key supplier for rapidly growing brands, including Nike, Adidas, Patagonia and Lululemon. Following the recovery of the Great Financial Crisis in 2009, Eclat’s revenue soared from 200 million in 2009, to 1.263 billion in 2022. Eclat produces a number of specialized fabrics combining features for sportswear (moisture, control, UV protection), outdoor (thermal, waterproof, lightweight), and sustainability (organic cotton, recycled, bio-based fibers). While Eclat holds a number of patents on these fabric technologies, intellectual property rights only accounted for 0.05% of its total asset portfolio. As it is the case for Shenzhou, Eclat’s dominant asset category are plants and textile machinery, which accounted for 41% of total assets.
Over time, Eclat strategically oriented its fabric capabilities towards athleisure, which combines fabric capabilities from casual, active and performance wear, offering buyers application specific fabrics. The largest revenue stream came from Eclat’s partnership with Lululemon, which began in the early 2000s. In becoming Lululemon’s sole supplier of luon – a stretchable and breathable fabric that combines nylon with spandex, Eclat was able to generate high unit values, given that yoga pants that Lululemon sold had a list price of USD 100 per piece, and were usually sold without discount. Despite the fact that Lululemon owned the trademark on luon, Eclat became the sole supplier for this fabric, accounting for 30% of all Lululemon fabric sourcing by the mid 2010s.
Vertical integration for fast growing buyers
Several conclusions can be drawn from Shenzhou’s and Eclat’s value capture trajectories. Intellectual property rights are not a necessary pre-condition to capture value in globalized production. Strategic buyer relationships are a necessary but not sufficient precondition for value capture. Establishing links to buyers that provide access to fast growing product markets – such as sportswear, athleisure, or functional wear – contains the potential for higher unit values. But brands like Nike or Lululemon have 280 and 65 suppliers respectively, and not all of these supplier firms outline the same value capture. The decisive factor is having integrated research and development and manufacturing capabilities that combine fabric production and apparel assembly. Thus, manufacturing activities in apparel global supply chains still offer an opportunity to capture value, but it depends on the kind of activities, their integration, and supplier firms’ business strategy to continuously invest in these capabilities.
Read more on this topic in our upcoming paper called ‘Capturing value in a buyers’ market: Bargaining power of supplier firms and value capture in the apparel global supply’, which will be published later this year.
Felix Maile is a PhD Researcher at the Department of Development Studies at the University of Vienna. His PhD investigates the role of financial markets and shareholder value on the sourcing strategies of apparel retailers and brands, the related power dynamics along the apparel GVC, and what this means for value capture in supplier countries.
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